

Project Management Challenge 2007



Track: Case Study Insights at NASA

Case Study:

Extracting Trends and Lessons Learned From Project Problems and Solutions

NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

February 6, 2007


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Presentation Outline








The Anomaly Management Vision







Anomaly Management Vision



- GSFC has well documented requirements, procedures, and best practices for mission-related problem management, reporting, analysis, and trending
- GSFC efficiently verifies adherence to the established problem management requirements and established best practices
- All GSFC development and on-orbit missions use a consistent problem management process and philosophy
 - Flexible enough to handle the diversity of spacecraft missions in the organization, enforcing certain fundamental "rules" for all missions, but allowing some differences where appropriate in other areas
 - Example: HST vs. Small Explorer Program
 - Recognizes that risks and budgets can be very different among programs
 - Applies to all missions that the organization is responsible for, regardless of whether or not the missions are built and/or flown "inhouse"
 - NASA responsible for mission success regardless of approach to development or operations (i.e., in or out of house)
 - Out-of-house missions do pose unique challenges



Anomaly Management Vision (cont)




- GSFC provides online access to accurate mission configuration information for all Goddard managed missions in development and operations
 - Example: Subsystems, components, orbit configuration, duty cycles
- GSFC analyzes and trends problems across development and onorbit missions
 - Individual missions, across mission "families", across all missions
 - Consistent use of a variety of Categorizations (e.g., failure type, root cause, impact)
- GSFC extracts appropriate "Lessons Learned" information from the problem and solution space and apply these back into the development and operations processes
 - Examples: improvements in Rules/Best Practices for development, testing, and operations; planned vs. actual hardware & software performance



Problem Management Information Flow








Lessons Learned Feedback Process








Implementing The Vision







Implementation Approach



- Ensure appropriate requirements are officially documented so that they apply to all missions in development and operations
 - Goddard Procedures and Requirements Documents (GPR's)
 - Mission Assurance Requirements (MAR) Document (per mission), with the Mission Assurance Guideline (MAG) document as a template
- Establish and document rules/best practices for how to document anomalies
 - Main goal is to achieve the needed consistency and robustness across missions
 - Anomaly Management Best Practices Handbook (or comparable)
- Utilize a centralized, independent operations mission assurance team to verify adherence across missions to requirements and best practices
 - Provides ability to recognize and correct problems early



Implementation Approach (cont)



- Utilize a centralized anomaly trending and analysis team to perform various trending and analysis functions within and across missions
 - Assist in development of Mission Configurations
 - Analyze trends
 - Extract "lessons learned" and work to apply them across the relevant organizations, documents, etc.
 - Implement a "Lessons Learned CCB" with broad participation to disposition potential/proposed lessons learned and best practices
- Utilize a centralized database to capture problem report data that provides ability:
 - For individual missions to document, track, and close out their problems
 - For the Center to perform various analysis and trend functions across missions
 - To handle development/test (pre-launch) and operations phases
 - To handle flight and ground problems
 - To bring in data from outside users
 - To provide broad access, but with appropriate access protections (for ITAR sensitive and proprietary data)



Implementation Approach (cont)




- The centralized database is the Goddard Problem Reporting System (GPRS), which contains two modules for documenting and managing ground and flight segment problems
 - Both provide multi-mission, web-based, secure user access
 - Other features include Mission Configuration definition, search/query capabilities, user notification (via email), user privilege control, user problem reporting, and attachments
- SOARS -- Spacecraft Orbital Anomaly Reporting System
 - Used to document flight and ground problems during operations
 - Problems categorized via a common approach, using various
 Categorization Fields (Anomaly Classification, Impacts, Root Cause)
- PR/PFR -- Problem Reporting/Problem Failure Reporting System
 - Used to capture problems encountered during the development, integration, and test
 - Similar to SOARS, but tailored to the I&T environment (e.g., the signature process)



SOARS Model








Current Status:



Where Are We Today?





Current Status



- Requirements & Best Practices Development/Compliance
 - High-level requirements associated with using GPRS and performing quality assurance, trending, and analysis are in place
 - GPR 1710.H Corrective and Preventative Action
 - GPR 5340.2 Control of Nonconformances
 - Mission Assurance Requirements Documents, with the Mission Assurance Guideline (MAG) document as a template also generally cover the requirements
 - But, capturing problem information in the central PR/PFR System limited to in-house missions for pre-launch phase
 - Operations Rules/Best Practices not yet formally documented in a central location that would apply across all missions
 - Exist in pockets within missions, families of missions, and Programs
 - Working with missions and Programs to begin development



Current Status (cont)



- Operational Improvements
 - Major GPRS enhancements made to SOARS and PR/PFR software over the last year to improve operational usability, etc.
 - SOARS now considered an operationally useful tool, with ongoing activities to continue incremental improvements
 - PR/PFR has more recently undergone improvement, largely driven by two Goddard in-house missions (SDO and LRO)
 - PR/PFR needs much more improvement to "catch-up" to SOARS
 - SOARS use by the operational missions has increased dramatically over the last year
 - One year ago very few missions were using SOARS at Goddard
 - Almost all in-house missions (~20) now using SOARS effectively, including RXTE, Terra, Aqua, EO-1, and TDRSS
 - Only one out-of-house mission currently populating SOARS with anomaly report data (Swift at Penn State University, as a direct user)
 - Other out-of-house "operations vendors" include APL, Orbital, LASP, and University of California at Berkeley (UCB)
 - Currently working with these organizations to develop plan for populating SOARS (e.g., make use of data import)



Current Status (cont)



- Anomaly Analysis and Trending
 - Centralized teams in place within Office of Mission Assurance (Code 300) for performing roles of operations mission assurance and crossmission anomaly analysis and trending
 - Development phase handled by individual Code 300 System Assurance Managers (SAM's) assigned to missions
 - GSFC (Code 300) using SOARS data extraction to:
 - Provide monthly Center-wide snapshot of mission anomalies, characterized by Mission Impact, Operations Impact, and Root Cause
 - Develop annual "year-in-review" anomaly summary report (OAGS)
 - Trend and analyze problems across missions, subsystems, failure types, etc.
 - Support long term reliability studies on flight hardware
 - Identify missions that are not adequately documenting anomalies and work with them to improve




SOARS Data Extraction – Example 1



SOAR Records - All active Goddard Missions

(12 month summary)



Significant Nov'06 On-orbit Anomalies

Msn-X power load shed anomaly

- All science instrument main voltages shed in accordance to the Under Voltage protection Circuitry
- Under voltage condition, possibly indicating a failure (short) somewhere in the affected loads


Msn-Y Star Tracker and Sun Sensor Boresight anomaly

Star Tracker alignment calibration analysis indicates over a 2 arcminute shift in the alignment between the Star Tracker and FSS


Msn-Z ACS Quaternion Spike Error anomaly

- Star Tracker Quaternion element was corrupted
- Spacecraft commanded to Sun/Mag pointing and the Star Tracker stabilized

Root Cause Categorization for Cum CY06 "Ops Workaround" SOAR's




Root Cause Categorization for Cum CY06 "Data Loss" SOAR's







SOARS Data Extraction – Example 2
















CY06 Cumulative Anomaly Classification Categorization



CY06 Cumulative Mission Impact Categorization






Current Status (cont)



- Inserting "Lessons Learned" into the Process
 - Implementing an "Operations Lessons Learned" process, but still in the very early stages
 - Plan is to implement a process where a Lessons Learned Committee/Board is presented with potential lessons
 - Committee determines if lesson valid, and if so, the actions that are appropriate to take it forward
 - Working to engage broad participation (mission assurance, missions, and engineering)





Sample Lessons Learned Summary



Mission	Anomaly Date	Anomaly Description	Proposed Lesson Learned	Action
Msn_X	10/3/06	Spacecraft clock rollover to an illegal 1998 date; on-board clock register capacity was exceeded.	Establish best practice of evaluating registers prior to launch, and as part of the on-orbit ops procedures. Include FSW capabilities to issue warnings when appropriate.	Work directly with Ops Projects to document as Ops Best Practice. Work with Flight Software Branch to determine if design best practice needed.
Msn_Y	10/19/06	UV instrument experiencing channel noise, apparently associated with heater activation and environmental conditions. Causing failure of instrument to meet signal to noise ratio requirements for the data channel.	Lesson tbd, but would apply to improving test approach. Seems this should have been caught in instrument or observatory I&T. Why was this not seen during thermal vac? Does this have implications to other missions? Could or should this instrument sensitivity have been better tested during instrument I&T?	Investigate further. Discuss with Msn_Y SAM and I&T Manager. Generate independent analysis report if warranted.



Implementation Challenges



- Achieving consistency across missions in how anomalies are documented (e.g., terminology, level of detail) and categorized is proving to be very difficult
 - Many missions with different ops teams have different taxonomies, operations cultures, etc.
 - Missions themselves also very different in terms of bus design, payload suite, operations profile, age, and risk tolerance
- Mission Configuration definitions in SOARS not well-defined across all missions, making it difficult to perform cross-mission analyses
 - Not all information is readily available to use in SOARS definitions, especially for older missions (e.g., component manufacturers and design life)
 - Missions have struggled to put in the extra time to populate SOARS with their Mission Configurations
 - Working with the existing missions to improve the definitions, but effort is time consuming and challenging
 - Working with upcoming missions to get the definitions in place prior to launch (e.g., GLAST, SDO, and LRO)



Implementation Challenges (cont)




- Proving very difficult to get out-of-house operations centers/teams to document problems in SOARS
 - Only one direct user so far (Swift/PSU)
 - Working with others to take advantage of enhanced SOARS data import capability
 - Finding that the critical factor is getting the agreement more explicitly planned well before launch
- Only getting pre-launch problem report data into PR/PFR for inhouse missions
 - Leaves a big "information gap" given the high number of out-of-house missions
 - Vendors cannot use PR/PFR directly, but working to determine if certain types of problem report data can be imported into PR/PFR



Gap Analysis







Gap Analysis:



How Would You Complete "The Job"?

- 1. How would you approach achieving and maintaining more consistency across missions in how anomalies are documented?
 - Getting them to do it consistently over time
 - Working to measure/enforce consistency over time
- 2. Do you think it is possible to develop a set of Operations Anomaly Management Best Practices that would reasonably apply across a set of heterogeneous missions, that are a mix of in-house and out-of-house operations approaches?
 - If so, how would you approach getting this defined and keeping it updated?
 - If not, what can be done? Do you just give up?
- 3. What type of information besides the basic anomaly information would you want to capture for your missions to support long term trending, reliability/failure analysis, etc?



Gap Analysis:



How Would You Complete "The Job"?

- 4. How would you ensure that the relevant Mission Configuration information for upcoming missions is documented so that it is usable by the problem management system?
 - Address the in-house vs. out-of-house challenges
- 5. How would you approach getting more out-of-house operations centers/teams to document their anomalies in the centralized problem information system (SOARS)?
- 6. How do you extract problem information from out-of-house mission vendors for use in the centralized problem information system (PR/PFR) during the pre-launch development phase?
 - Will likely have proprietary data issues
- 7. How do you integrate lessons learned into projects/programs so that they will actually affect mission development and operations, and maintain benefit over time?





BACKUP SLIDES



SOARS Anomaly Report Form



GPRS Home	Add A SOAR Taylor Hale, Flight Operations Team Member for TEST-SC	^
Add A SOAR	Taylor Fide, Flight Operations Team Member for TEST-SC	
Update/Close A SOAR	Import SOAR Records	
Search/Reports	[* Required for Submitting + Required for Opening *** Required for Closing]	
My SOARS Page	*Spacecraft: WAnomaly Time (GMT):	
	Project Number: OR	
My Profile	*Anomaly Category: Date: 12/11/2006 Time:	
Mission Configuration	O Polar Coordinates ECI Coordinates Sun/Dark:	
	S Latitude: X: Revolution #:	
LOGOUT	R Longitude: Y:	
Too you will be	A Altitude: Z: Ascybest . Spacecraft Mode: W Mission Phase: W	
SOARS User's Guide	I O *Anomaly Title:	
SOAR Field	* Anomaly Description:	
<u>Definitions</u>		
Request a Change /		
Report An Application	COLLAPSE	
Problem	SOAR State: SUBMITTED ♥ SOAR Current Status: ♥ *** Criticality: ▼	
Printable Blank	*** + Subsystem/Instrument: Component:	
SOAR Input Form	Assign To: None V *** Is this a recurring anomaly?: YeONo	
	E S Assembly Name : Part Name :	
	T Assembly ID: Part Number:	
	I G Assembly Serial Number: Drawing Ref Designator:	
	A Assembly Manufacturer:	
	I Investigation Log:	
		~
Done		



SOARS Anomaly Report Form (cont)



Report An			COLLAPSE		^
Application Problem	SOAR State: SUBMITTED SOAR Current Status:	*** Criticality:	~		
Printable Blank	*** + Subsystem/Instrument:	*** Component:			
SOAR Input Form	Assign To: None ✓				
	** Is this a recurring anomaly?: YeONo O				
	Assembly Name :	Part Name :			
	Assembly ID:	Part Number:			
	Assembly Serial Number : Assembly Manufacturer:	Drawing Ref Designator:			
	Investigation Log:				
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			56		
	*** Cause of the Anomaly:				
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	Follow-on Actions/Recommendations:		41		
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1		*** Anomaly Root Cause:			
	*** Anomaly Closure Date: [79]				
	** Was a Mishap Report or Code 400 Anomaly Report (400-P	G-8621.0.1x) required? Yes to 0			
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SOARS Anomaly Report Form



Update Or Close A SOAR Taylor Hale, 20/45 Gobal System Administrator	Observation area include	a all problem descriptions
SOAR # 5-TEST-9C-0046 (E-252) State : SUBMITED	including orbit and attitu	es all problem descriptions de data, and other user
Spacecreft TEXT-6C Ny	defined fields	
Polar Coordinates ECC. Coordinates Revolution 2	Investigation area provid	•
O Anomaly Description : Tent description will the anomaly. SOAR State : AUGUSTED N SOAR Current Status:	operations team to docu investigation and status.	Includes an investigative
Sounceses Communes Sounceses Service Sounceses Component Sounceses	log, subsystem and com anomaly criticality, statu	-
Assembly 10 : Part Number :	assignment.	s, and responsibility
Cause of the Anomaly:	Resolution area provides	the operations team an text
U Corrective Action :	area to capture a synops resolution.	is of the problem cause and
Pollovon Actions/Recommendations :		
** planion Impact :	Assessment area is used activities or recommenda	_
Was a Mishap Report or Code 400 Anomaly Report (400-PG6021.0.1.1) required? Yaz()(c () Designate 300A5 for internal mission was and similality only? Y(C) (to ()) Retolify These People About 15th 300A1: (The people on the Indicated sac of Institut Revenued will be motified when the 18th on InterpATATEM button is greated. Any othergape to the indicators but will not be seed first liber of the indication are set on the Prevail Any of the Indication as will need to be seed first liber of the indication one be not to the row lat of	SOAR for generic use.	
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SOARS Data Summary



- All SOARS anomaly reports will include the following information:
 - Anomaly occurrence time
 - Anomaly title
 - Anomaly category (flight or ground segment specification)
 - Anomaly Subsystem and Component identification
 - Anomaly description
 - Closure information
 - Follow-on recommendations
 - Anomaly categorization
- SOARS may include the following types of information:
 - Anomaly assignment and responsible party
 - Investigation information
 - Orbital information
 - Mission unique phase and mode
 - Additional file attachments as appropriate



SOAR Data Categorization



- SOAR Categorization Fields are the key fields used for trending and analysis across missions for the Center. The fields include:
 - Mission Impact: describes the actual anomaly impact on the ability to meet Science and/or Mission Goals or requirements
 - No Effect, Minor, Substantial, Major, Catastrophic, Undetermined
 - Impact Severity on the Anomalous Item: describes the actual impact to the subsystem or component where the anomaly occurred
 - No Effect, Minor, Major, Catastrophic, Undetermined, Not applicable
 - Operations Impact: describes the effect of the anomaly on mission and/or science operations
 - Data Loss, Service Loss, Mission Degradation/Loss, Undetermined, Ops Workaround, None
 - Anomaly Classification: describes where within the mission systems the failure occurred
 - Hardware, Software, Operations, Other
 - Anomaly Root Cause: describes the root cause of the anomaly.
 - Design, Workmanship/Implementation, Process, Environmental, Degradation, Hardware Failure, Training, Human Error, Unknown



One Size Fits All Anomaly Management (AM) System: Does It Exist?



Mission Phases

(S/C I&T, Observatory I&T, L&EO, Normal Ops, Disposal)

Missions

- AM System must meet the needs of individual missions and of the broader multiple mission perspective (e.g., looking for cross mission trends)
- Mission may want one discrepancy/anomaly management system through all mission phases, but the phases are very different environments (pre and post-launch)
- AM System may have to handle spacecraft and ground anomalies
- AM System inevitably must be able to interface with other AM Systems used by individual missions